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The Geronimo Bank Murders: 
A Gay Tragedy 
Joan W Howarth' 
The Geronimo Bank Murders examines the intersection of homosexuality and capital 
punishment through the lenses of cultural criticism, queer theory, and legal analysis. The paper's 
subject is Jay Neill, who ImS executed in 2002 for murdenng fOur people in a gruesome Geronimo, 
Oklahoma bank robbery in 1984, and fOr being gay. Current capital punishment doctrine pennits, 
and perhaps even encourages, such results. The Geronimo Bank Murders recasts Neill's story, 
privileging homosexuality and gender, and uses that account to make three points, each based In 
law, culture, and politics. First, as a matter of legal doctrine, recognizing the elTOr in using 
homosexuality to obtain a death sentence requires a nonnative judgment about gay identity, one 
that courts are increasingly prepared to make. Second, the gay-centric reading of Neill's trial 
reveals the shallow literalism of hannless elTOr review of capital sentencing errors, the chief 
mechanism through which flawed verdicts such as Neill's are executed Finally, the interpretation 
of Neill's life, cnmes as well as punishment, as a gay story usefUlly challenges and disrupts the 
valonzing and aSSImilative tendencies of the gay nghts movement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Jay Wesley Neill was executed on December 12, 2002, for 
murdering four people in a gruesome Geronimo, Oklahoma bank 
* © 2008 Joan W. Howarth. William S. Boyd Professor of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas. Through his attorney, James L. Hankins, Jay Neill chose to cooperate with this 
project, permitting his lawyer to give me transcripts and other materials from the case. I am very 
grateful to both of them. This project began when I was Scholar-in-Residence at the Boalt Center 
for Social Justice, and was finished with research support from the Boyd School of Law. I 
presented earlier versions of this Article at a faculty workshop at the University of San Francisco 
School of Law and at Assimilation and Resistance: EmergIng Issues in law and Sexuality, a 
conference sponsored by the Seattle University School of Law. I am grateful for the institutional 
support and helpful comments I received in all of those settings. I also appreciate the thoughtful 
comments on an earlier draft by my UNLV colleagues Raquel Aldana, Annette Appell, Mary 
LaFrance, Ann McGinley, Nancy Rapoport, and Elaine Shoben and by David Dow and Timothy 
Kaufman-Osborn. Judy Cox (Boyd '08) provided superb research assistance, and Diana Gleason 
added excellent library support. 
39 
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robbery on December 16, 1984, and for being gay.' At trial, in the 
closing argument for death, the prosecutor told the jurors that Neill's 
identity as a homosexual was a reason to return a death verdice Later 
that afternoon they did.3 A divided panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined that the prosecutor's words 
were error, but not prejudicial.4 By what analysis is such an argument 
error? In what world is such an error harmless? 
Neill's terrible story calls out for a critical cultural, legal, and 
political reading. Neill's case reveals the power of law to construct and 
condemn homosexual identity. Constitutional death penalty doctrine 
requires capital jurors to choose life or death by judging the defendant's 
character. 5 This inquiry makes cases of gay capital defendants potentially 
powerful sites of contested meanings of gay identity,6 and rich cultural 
artifacts about homosexuality. 7 Sentencing a person to death because of 
moral distaste for homosexuality is itself morally reprehensible, but 
current capital doctrine permits and perhaps even encourages such 
results. The Tenth Circuit's treatment of the prosecutor's arguments about 
homosexuality lays bare the faulty formalism that underlies harmless 
error review of death verdicts. Neill's crimes and punishment also 
challenge and disrupt the valorizing tendencies of the identity-based gay 
rights movement. What if Neill's gay identity was as salient to his crimes 
as to his punishment? 
1. See Jay Wesley Neill, http://action.web.ca/home/1gbtJalerts.shtml?x=27183&AA_ 
EX_Session=3e 17ae55455400578f2256b8bbbcfea5 (last visited Apr. 4, 2008). 
2. Neill v. Gibson (Neill Il), 278 F.3d 1044, 1061 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 
835 (2002) (citing to Trial Transcript at 1287). 
3. Neill v. Gibson (Neill l), 263 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (rehearing granted, 
petition for rehearing en banc denied). 
4. Id at 1197; NeillJl, 278 F.3d at 1061. 
5. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006) ("The Eighth Amendment ... insists that 
a sentencing jury be able 'to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence' about the defendant's 
'character or record or the circumstances of the offense.'" (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302,327-28 (1989))). 
6. David Garland shows that punishment is symbolically powerful because "the 
intractable problems of social and human existence provide a rich soil for the development of 
myths, rites and symbols, as cultures strive to control and make sense of these difficult areas of 
experience." David Garland, Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal 
Justice, 11 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'y 191,216 (1991). 
7. "Treating law as a cultural reality means looking at the material structure oflaw to see 
it in play and at play, as signs and symbols, fantasies and phantasms." Christian Boulanger & 
Austin Sarat, Putting Culture into the Picture: Toward a Comparative Analysis of State Killing, in 
THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 15 (Austin Sarat 
& Christian Boulanger eds., 2005) (footnote omitted). 
HeinOnline -- 17 Law & Sexuality Rev. Lesbian Gay Bisexual & Transgender Legal Issues 41 2008
2008] THE GERONIMO BANK MURDERS 41 
To address these issues, Part I of this Article presents a close 
reading of the Tenth Circuit appellate decisions that considered and 
rejected Neill's claim that his death sentence was impermissibly tainted 
by prejudicial, antihomosexual prosecutorial misconduct. Part II 
provides a reading of Neill's crime and punishment as a gay story, 
considering both the explicit and the many more subtle references to 
homosexuality and gender throughout the formal legal proceedings 
against Neill and within the contemporaneous local journalism about his 
crimes. Part III turns to the question of what makes the prosecutor's 
argument error. Recognition of the error is, fundamentally, a positive 
normative judgment about homosexuality, similar in many ways to the 
normative perspective taken by the United States Supreme Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas.8 Neill's case showcases enormous changes in how 
homosexuality has been culturally framed and legally constituted in the 
past two decades, in a sense creating an error where none existed before. 
Part IV uses the extravagantly shifting meanings of homosexuality 
and the prominence of Neill's homosexuality in the trial participants' 
understanding of his crimes, to reveal the shallow methodology of 
harmless error analysis as used for constitutional errors in capital penalty 
trials. The Article concludes by recognizing that reading the Geronimo 
Bank Murders as a gay tragedy pushes the identity-based gay rights 
movement outside its assimilative comfort zone, and endorses the 
usefulness of that push. 
I. CONDEMNJNG BIAS, CONDEMNING NEILL 
By the time Neill's case reached federal habeas corpus review, the 
last meaningful stage in capitallitigation,9 his best legal argument was a 
claim that his execution would be unconstitutional because it was based 
on the explicit exhortation by the prosecutor to execute Neill in part 
because he was a homosexual. A panel of the Tenth Circuit addressed 
these issues twice. 1o The gruesome and horrible facts of Neill's crimes 
were set forth by the Tenth Circuit: 
A jury sentenced Neill to death after convicting him of four counts of first 
degree malice murder stemming from Neill's armed robbery of a 
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
9. See generally Andrew Gelman, James S. Liebman, Valerie West & Alexander Kiss, A 
Broken System: The Persistent Pattems of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, I 1. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004) (providing data related to state and federal court reversals of 
death verdicts). 
10. See generally Neill I, 263 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Neill II, 278 F.3d 1044 (10th 
Cir.2001). 
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Geronimo, Oklahoma bank in December 1984. Neill did not contest his 
guilt during the trial's fIrst stage. The State's evidence established that 
Neill, then age nineteen, and his codefendant, Grady Johnson, age twenty-
one, were roommates involved in a homosexual relationship. In 1984, they 
were having serious fmancial difficulties. During the week before the bank 
robbery, the pair purchased two knives, obtained a gun permit, bought a .32 
caliber handgun and ammunition, and made plane reservations to San 
Francisco for Friday afternoon, December 14. On that Friday, shortly after 
1 :00 P.M., Neill robbed the bank. During the robbery, Neill stabbed three 
bank employees to death. All three women died from multiple stab wounds 
to their head, neck, chest and abdomen. One woman was seven months 
pregnant. Neill also attempted to decapitate each woman with a knife. 
Five customers entered the bank during the robbery. Neill forced all 
five to lie face down in the back room where the employees had been 
stabbed. He then shot each customer in the head, killing one and wounding 
the other three .... 
Neill and Johnson then flew to San Francisco, where they spent some 
of the approximately $17,000 stolen from the bank on expensive jewelry 
and clothing, hotels, limousines and cocaine. FBI agents arrested the pair 
there three days after the robbery. 
Prior to this trial, Neill gave a videotaped interview to a religious 
television program, "The 700 Club," and wrote several letters to an author 
writing a book about the murders. Neill also wrote letters and made 
telephone calls apologizing to several victims. In these communications, 
Neill admitted committing the crimes." 
Neill did not contest his guilt,'2 but did seek life rather than death at trial, 
and challenged the death verdict in direct appeals and habeas corpus 
proceedings in Oklahoma and federal COurtS.13 
Among multiple claims, Neill contended to the Tenth Circuit that 
the prosecutor's repeated description of Neill as homosexual during 
closing argument constituted prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. '4 
Oklahoma's statutory capital sentencing scheme requires the jury to 
weigh mitigating factors (support for life) offered by the defendant 
II. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1188-89 (footnote omitted); see also Neill U, 278 F.3d at 1049-50 
(footnote omitted). The Tenth Circuit's cautious description of Neill and his codefendant as 
"roommates involved in a homosexual relationship" reveals some discomfort, and distancing, 
from the passionate romance and sexual relationship that was at the center of this story. Neill I, 
263 F.3d at 1188; cf MICHAEL WILLHOITE, DADDY'S ROOMMATE (1991) (children's book 
published by gay press in which a little boy tells about his parents' divorce and his father's 
relationship with his new "roommate"). 
12. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1188. 
13. See Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1080 
(1996); Neill v. State, 943 P.2d 145 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Neill told the jury that he would not 
appeal from a sentence of life without parole. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1198. 
14. Neil I, 263 F.3d at 1197. 
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against enumerated aggravating factors (support for death) presented by 
the state. IS The Oklahoma Supreme Court had identified as appropriate 
mitigation any evidence suggesting that a capital defendant was acting 
under "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" when he committed 
the crime. 16 Neill's defense argued that this mitigating factor applied 
because Neill had committed the crimes suffering from extreme 
emotional disturbance caused by his fear of losing his relationship with 
Johnson, and the jury was given an instruction that supported this claim 
of mitigation. 17 In response, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Neill 
was "a vowed homosexual. He had a gay lover he didn't want to lose.,,18 
Judge Deanell Reece Tacha's opinion noted that "[t]he prosecutor then 
compared Neill's situation to the breakup of a heterosexual relationship 
or marriage, arguing neither instance justified murder.,,19 
Having set forth the contested argument, Judge Tacha offhandedly 
rejected the claim: 
These comments on Neill's homosexuality were accurate, in light of the 
evidence, and were relevant to both the State's case and Neill's defense 
theory. Trial counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for failing to object. 
The prosecutor made additional remarks aimed at Neill's 
homosexuality. Because defense counsel did object to those remarks, 
however, he was not constitutionally ineffective.20 
This cavalier treatment of the issue provoked a blistering dissent by 
Judge Carlos F. Lucero.21 With rhetorical escalation beyond the usual 
voice of the federal appellate judiciary,22 Judge Lucero blasted: "Because 
the prosecutor's blatant homophobic hatemongering at sentencing has no 
place in the courtrooms of a civilized society, and Neill's appellate 
counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal constitutes clear and 
15. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.10, 701.11 (West 2007). 
16. Cox v. State, 644 P.2d 1077,1079 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 
17. Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537,558 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
18. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 1283). "A 
vowed" was a misstatement or mis-transcription of "avowed." The mistake evokes marriage 
vows, decidedly not available to Neill and Johnson in Oklahoma at the time of this case. 
Alternatively, as suggested to me by Timothy Kaufinan-Osborn, this might evoke the 
performative utterance, "I promise to be gay," the meaning of which might entail adoption of a 
particular identity, sexual desire, activity, relationships to others, or something else. 
19. Id 
20. Id 
21. See id at 1199-1204 (Lucero, 1., dissenting). 
22. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetonc and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 
1545, 1563 (1990) (claiming that passionate writing that sounds more like the "rhetoric of 
politics" than the "rhetoric of law" is often found in dissents on such sensitive subjects as the 
death penalty or homosexuality). 
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plain prejudicial neglect, I respectfully dissent.,m While expressing 
reservations about the phrase and the standard, Judge Lucero described 
Neill's argument as a "dead-bang winner,,24 and provided a more 
complete excerpt of the prosecutor's argument to the sentencing jury: 
If I could ask each of you to disregard Jay Neill and take him out of the 
person but consider these things in a generic way. I want you to think 
briefly about the man you're setting [sic] in judgment on ... and believe 
me, ... you have every thing [sic] in this case, the good, the bad, everything 
that the law allows to aid you in this decision. But just generic, just put in 
the back of your mind what if I was sitting in judgment on this person 
without relating it to Jay Neill, and I'd like to go through some things that 
to me depict the true person, what kind of person he is. He is a 
homosexual. The person you're sitting in judgment on-disregard Jay 
Neill. You're deciding life or death on a person that's a vowed [sic] 
homosexual. . .. But these are areas you consider whenever you determine 
the type of person you're setting [sic] in judgment on. . .. The individual's 
homosexual. He's in love with Robert Grady Johnson.25 
Judge Lucero's skepticism cut through the prosecutor's self-
justification: "While thinly disguising his intent by denying that a 
person's 'sexual preference' is an 'aggravating circumstance,' the 
prosecutor deviously and despicably incited the jury with the [preceding] 
statement.,,26 Judge Lucero understood these comments as "susceptible 
of only one possible interpretation: among other factors, Neill should be 
put to death because he is gay.,,27 
Judge Lucero captured the prosecutor's purpose out of his 
convoluted, strange argument. Somehow, the trial attorney had wrapped 
himself up in some of the most difficult deontological questions. What is 
left when one takes Jay Neill "out of the person"? Was it possible for a 
juror to sit in judgment on the defendant Jay Neill "without relating it to 
Jay Neill"? We can surmise that the prosecutor, rather than purposively 
23. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1199 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
24. /d at 1199. The "dead-bang winner" phrasing would be even more remarkable if 
Oklahoma used a firing squad instead oflethal injection. 
25. /d (quoting Trial Transcript at 1285-87). The prosecutor's awkward invitation to 
"disregard Jay Neill and take him out of the person" was presumably a poorly executed attempt to 
counter the standard defense strategy of humanizing the capital defendant. /d "Wake up a 
capital defense lawyer in the middle of the night and ask, what is your most important task in the 
penally phase?, and the response will be, humanize my cJient" Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation 
and the Capif1ll Defendant H-1Jo Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetonc of Autonomy and the 
l/Jdden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HAsTINGS L.J. 693, 736 (2006). 
26. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1199 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
27. /d at 1201. 
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embarking on some post-structuralist detour,28 feared that some members 
of the jury might have found something human and worth saving in Jay 
Neill. Perhaps they felt sorry for him. Perhaps they were moved by his 
attempts to make amends,29 or his religious faith.30 Or perhaps they were 
moved by his successful communications with his victims and the 
testimony of one of the victims that she had forgiven him.31 Perhaps they 
were inclined to find redemption in him because of his renunciation of 
his homosexuality on Pat Robertson's 700 Club.32 
Defending against any of these possibilities, the prosecutor needed 
to separate the humanity from the defendant. His first rhetorical move 
then, consistent with the well-entrenched traditions that associate 
homosexuality with evil, crime, or sin, was to emphasize Neill's 
homosexuality as the aspect of his identity that marked "the true person, 
what kind of person he is.,,33 In this perverse way, the prosecutor joined 
in the now-familiar discourse asserting that gay identity is central to 
personhood.34 
Judge Lucero's Tenth Circuit dissent emphasized the monumental 
prejudicial impact of the remarks.35 Judge Lucero accepted as 
appropriate the prosecutor's withering argument that "losing a lover" 
does not justify robbing a bank, but found that the additional comments 
emphasizing Neill's identity as homosexual "add nothing to the critique 
and only serve to highlight the irrelevant and prejudicial fact of Neill's 
sexual orientation. The prosecutor's comments a few pages later in the 
transcript are totally unresponsive to Neill's mitigation evidence and are 
designed solely to inflame the jury's prejudices."36 
To the State's claim that these comments were all permissible 
because "it was Neill himself who 'introduced the issue of his sexual 
28. See, e.g., Judith Butler, "Appearances Aside'; 88 CAL. L. REv. 55, 59 (2000) ("[W]hat 
is it we purport to judge when we judge a person? Do we judge something that exists, or does our 
judgment bring into being by its own presumption about personhood, operating performatively, as 
it were, to install its speculative premise as human reality?"). 
29. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1189. 
30. Idat1198. 
31. Id 
32. Killer Tells of Slaying at Geronimo, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 1, 1986, at 1,2. 
33. Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1199 (Lucero, 1., dissenting (quoting Trial Transcript at 1285-86». 
34. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
35. "As the prosecutor knew, emphasizing that Neill was gay likely had a tremendous 
negative impact on jurors." Neill I, 263 F.3d at 1201 (citations omitted) (Lucero, 1., dissenting). 
Judge Lucero cited Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit decisions, law review commentary, and a 
report from a Judicial Council of California Sexual Orientation Fairness Subcommittee to support 
this claim. Id at 1201-02. 
36. Id at 1202. 
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orientation,"'37 Judge Lucero countered with an analogy to anti-
Semitism: "To my mind that argument is no different from claiming that 
a Jewish defendant opens the door to a prosecutor's anti-Semitic 
arguments by wearing a yarmulke in the presence of jurors.,,38 
Concluding with an argument focused on the constitutional requirement 
that death sentences "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than 
caprice or emotion,,,39 Judge Lucero determined that Neill's appellate 
counsel rendered constitutionally defective assistance of counsel by 
failing to raise as error on appeal these "bigoted comments''''O of the 
prosecutor, and that the procedural default was excused.41 
Echoing the status versus conduct preoccupation of legal theory 
attempting to deal with Bowers v. Hardwick,42 Judge Lucero concluded, 
"I cannot sanction-because I have no confidence in-a proceeding 
tainted by a prosecutor's request that jurors impose a death sentence 
based, even in part, on who the defendant is rather than what he has 
done.''''3 Although morally appealing, this complaint makes no sense 
under well-established capital jurisprudence. In the thirty years since the 
Supreme Court decided Woodson v. North Carolina44 and Lockett v. 
Ohio,45 capital sentencing in the United States has been precisely a 
project of determining who the defendant is.46 Lockett established that a 
capital sentencing jury must "not be precluded from considering, as a 
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that 
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.''''7 Judge 
Lucero must have been using shorthand, meaning that one's identity as a 
homosexual, unlike, for example, one's identity as a murderer, is an 
impermissible basis for a sentence of death. 
37. Id (quoting Appellee's Briefat 42). 
38. Id The opinion proceeds to compare antihomosexual rhetoric to racial, national, or 
religious prejudice. Id at 1202-03. 
39. Id at 1203 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 US. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality)). 
40. Id 
41. Id Judge Lucero also found that Neill's counsel was ineffective for failing to ask 
three jurors whether they were predisposed to impose death. Id at 1203-04. The combined 
prejudice from both errors was sufficient, according to Judge Lucero, to require vacation of 
Neill's death sentence. Id 
42. 478 US. 186 (1986); see, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy- Act and 
Identity in and Alier Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual 
Onentation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal 
Protection, 55 U CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1170 (1988). 
43. Nelli I, 263 F.3d at 1203 (Lucero, 1., dissenting); cf. Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: 
Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.1. 1862, 1907-10 (2006). 
44. 428 US. 280 (1976). 
45. 438 US. 586 (1978). 
46. See Woods-on, 428 US. at 303-05. 
47. Lockett, 438 US. at 604 (italics omitted). 
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The righteousness and vigor of Judge Lucero's dissent got the 
attention of the rest of the Tenth Circuit panel, which granted Neill's 
petition for rehearing.48 The second time around the result and the two-
to-one decision remained the same, but both sides modified their 
rhetoric.49 
Writing again for the majority, Chief Judge Tacha rejected Neill's 
arguments about the first contested comments of the prosecutor-that 
losing a lover did not justifY robbing a bank-with an extended treatment 
that reached the same conclusion.50 Judge Tacha seemed to have had her 
consciousness raised, though, regarding the second set of comments. Her 
revised opinion now condemned the prosecutor's emphasis on Neill's 
character as "a vowed homosexual,,:51 "There does not appear to be any 
legitimate justification for these remarks. They are improper.,,52 
Thus, the two NeillTenth Circuit opinions provide one answer to the 
question implied by Justice Scalia's lament in his Romer v. Evans dissent: 
when did it become un-American to condemn homosexuality?53 In the 
weeks or months between the first and second Neil] opinions, the Tenth 
Circuit Nell] panel reflected a cultural transformation analogous to that 
made by the Supreme Court between Bowers v. HardwicR4 and 
Lawrence v. Texas. 55 the transformation from condemning homosexuality 
to condemning antihomosexual bias. Judge Tacha cited no authority for 
her new conclusion that the prosecutor's highlighting of Neill's 
homosexuality was improper. 56 Instead, the error that had been ignored 
in the first opinion became self-evident in the second. 
Unfortunately for Neill, although the court's rhetoric became more 
sensitive on rehearing, the result did not change.57 Chief Judge Tacha 
reminded us that "not every improper or unfair remark made by a 
48. Neill II, 278 F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir. 2001). 
49. See generally Neill I, 263 F.3d 1184 (lOth Cir. 2001); Neill II, 278 F.3d 1044 (10th 
Cir.2001). 
50. Neill II, 278 F.3d at 1060. 
51. Id 
52. ld at 106l. 
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Coloradans have 
been guilty of 'animus' or 'animosity' toward homosexuality, as though that has been established 
as un-American."). 
54. 478 U.S. 186 (l986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause 
does not provide a fundamental right to engage in acts of consensual homosexual sodomy). 
55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers, 478 U.S. 186). 
56. See generally Neill II, 278 F.3d at 1044-64. 
57. See generally id 
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prosecutor will amount to a federal constitutional deprivation,,,58 and that 
the "relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting [ sentencing decision] a 
denial of due process.,,59 
After reciting the strong case of guilt, which was not contested, and 
the most prejudicial facts, including that after the murders ''Neill flew to 
San Francisco with Johnson, where they spent the stolen money on 
expensive jewelry and clothing, hotels, limousines and cocaine,"60 the 
appellate court concluded: "without in any way condoning the 
prosecutor's remarks, we cannot say that they tipped the scales of justice 
in the State's favor or precluded jurors from considering the evidence 
fairly.,,61 In other words, the prosecutor's attempt to persuade the jury to 
sentence Neill to death because he was gay was harmless error. 
On rehearing, Judge Lucero moderated his rhetoric but continued to 
dissene2 Judge Lucero commended the majority's new conclusion that 
these words were improper, but refused to join the majority in reducing 
the prosecutor's argument to "a matter of propriety.,,63 To the contrary, 
Judge Lucero concluded that the prosecutor's words deprived Neill of a 
fair trial.64 The dissent challenged the majority's failure to consider the 
context of widespread antihomosexual bias in which the trial was 
conducted: "unmentioned in [the majority's] analysis is the reality that 
gays and lesbians are held in contempt by substantial numbers among us. 
This well-known prejudice presents the oniyrationale for the prosecutor's 
direct plea that the jury 'disregard' Neill as a person and consider him 
instead 'a vowed [sic] homosexual.",65 Judge Lucero argued that blatant 
and direct pleas to bias "cannot be ignored,,66 and compared the anti-
homosexual remarks to racist comments: "We must draw the line where 
the racial or sexual plea is blatant and direct, and we must resolutely 
58. Id at 1061 (quoting Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 US. 320, 338 (1985) (plurality), cert. denied, 531 US. 1055 (2000) 
(No. 00-6580». 
59. Id (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 US. 168, 181 (1986». 
60. Id 
61. Id 
62. See generally id at 1064-76 (Lucero, 1., dissenting). 
63. Id at 1064. 
64. Id ("[T]he level of repugnancy of a crime must not dictate the level of adherence to 
those constitutional principles that define a fair trial in this country."). 
65. Id 
66. Id at 1065. 
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resolve subject cases under that standard to assure that the line remains 
indelible."67 
Judge Lucero proceeded to document evidence of widespread 
contempt against gay people.68 Tellingly, Judge Lucero used Chief 
Justice Burger's infamous concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick as a prime 
example of such contempt.69 Chief Justice Burger's concurrence was 
issued six months after Neill's crimes.70 At the time it was written, the 
Burger concurrence was denounced as judicial hate speech by gay rights 
advocates.71 By 2001, it was used by a federal judge as an exemplar of 
impermissible bigotry.72 
Neither Judge Lucero's passionate dissent nor Neill's attorneys' 
vigorous defense saved his life.73 Following this loss in the Tenth Circuit 
and an unsuccessful petition for certiorari to the Supreme COurt,74 Jay 
Neill was executed on December 12,2002.75 
II. STATE OF OKLAHOMA v. NEILL: "A QUEER DEAL"?76 
Judge Lucero expressed outrage that the prosecutor emphasized 
Neill's homosexual identity in his argument for death. Yet, from the 
moment that Jay Neill and his lover, Grady "Robby" Johnson, were 
arrested three days after the murders, homosexuality was a salient and 
highly prejudicial aspect of this case for virtually everyone who knew 
67. Id He continued, "If by balancing the evidence against the challenged comments we 
allow the repugnancy of the crime to define the minimum standard offaimess of the adversary's 
sullied fray, we also allow an open appeal to prejudice to prevail." Id 
68. See id at 1066. 
69. Id (citing Bowers, 478 US. 186, 196-97 (1986)). Judge Lucero also used the Darden 
standards to evaluate the prejudicial impact of the prosecutorial misconduct, almost wavering 
between the justice of a per se rule of reversal and the more forgiving analysis currently under 
favor. Id at 1069-73. 
70. Nell I, 263 F.3d 1184, 1188 (Okla. Crim. App. 200 I); Bowers, 478 US. at 186. 
71. Eg., "The opinions against Hardwick's position from the Justices themselves sound 
similar to anti-gay epithets, albeit framed in legalisms." Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians 
Down by Law in the 1990's USA: The Continuing Toll ofBowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE 
U L. REv. I, 14 (1994); cf. Astrid A.M. Mattijssen & Charlene L. Smith, Dutch Treats: The 
Lessons the Us. Can Leam From How the Netherlands Protects Lesbians and Gays, 4 AM. UI. 
GENDER & L. 303, 314-15 (1996) (citing Burger's concurrence as an example of "common 
homophobic misinformation and prejudice" in the United States). 
72. See, e.g., Neill II, 278 F.3d at 1066. 
73. See Neill, supra note 1. 
74. 537 US. 835 202 (No. 01-10121). 
75. See Neill, supra note I. According to press reports, Neill's last words, to members of 
the victims' families who witnessed the execution, were, "I'm really sorry for what I did. I'm not 
sorry because I'm lying here dying." Bob Doucette, Geronimo Bank Slayer Executed at 
Penitentiary, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 13,2002, at I-A. 
76. See Chris Brawley, Police, Psychiatrist Dispute Homosexual Role, OKLAHOMAN, June 
16, 1985, at I-A (claiming that law enforcement officers privately called this a "queer deal"). 
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about them. A gay-centric accounting of the case establishes that no one 
made sense of the crimes or the legal proceedings except as a story about 
homosexuality.77 The impact of the prosecutor's closing argument should 
be assessed in the context of the entire case. 
The state's reading of this as a gay crime began as soon as Neill and 
Johnson were identified as suspects, or even before, by police accounts. 
As reported in the local press (and thus communicated to all participants 
in the case), the official story was that the gruesome brutality of the 
crimes showed that the perpetrator was homosexual. In discussing this 
investigation the chief inspector for the Oklahoma State Bureau of 
Investigation claimed that in "most cases of overkill . . . the perpetrator 
turns out to be a homosexual," a supposed fact and actual exemplar of 
breathtaking bigotry that he said agents were trained to know. 78 
Other law enforcement officials said they knew-before Neill and Johnson 
were arrested on a shopping spree in San Francisco--that it was 
homosexuals who viciously stabbed the three women at the Geronimo 
branch of the First Bank of Chattanooga. "That's the first thing I said," said 
Tony Burns, district attorney for Grady County. "There had to be sexual 
overtones towards the women. It had to be someone with an emotional 
problem towards women and (who) needed to feel superior to them.,,79 
77. Privileging the multiple constItutIVe performances and constructions of 
homosexuality is just one of many possible versions of this story. Another, for example, could 
make this a story of the West, emphasizing the frontier mentality, the claimed libertarianism of 
many of the jurors, and Neill's gender transgressions of the mythic, hyper-masculine Western 
outlaw. Cf. Judith Randle, The Cultural Lives ofCapitai Punishment in the Umted States, inTHE 
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 92 (Austin Sarat & 
Christian Boulanger eds., 2005) (focusing on capital punishment in the United States as 
illuminating regional identifications of the North and the South); see also RICHARD SLOTKIN, 
GUNFIGHTER NATION (I 992), quoted in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 129 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005) ("The primary 
social and political function of the extraordinary violence myth is to sanction the ordinary 
violence of oppression and injustice, of brutalities casual or systematic, or the segregation, insult 
or humiliation of targeted groups."). Neill's case also could be constructed as a story about 
childhood and youth, or perhaps about mental illness. 
78. Brawley, supra note 76. The newspaper account claimed that law enforcement 
officers privately call this a "queer deal." Id 
79. Id At the time of this crime, many medical examiners, including the chief medical 
examiner's office in Oklahoma City, used a text that claimed: 
Id 
Deaths resulting from male homosexual practices usually have a characteristic pattern 
both in the rmdings at the scene of the crime and in injuries resulting in the death .... 
[A]ccording to the medical examiner's book, murder with a homosexual aspect 
includes overkill, wounds all over the body and the use of a wide range of weapons, 
including knives, scissors, guns, bottles and hammers. 
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Shortly after Neill and Johnson were arrested, officials investigating 
the crimes told the press that the killings might have been retaliation for 
an antigay slur made by one of the victims when Neill and Johnson were 
at the bank attempting to arrange for a car loan. so An operations officer 
for the bank described Neill and Johnson as problem customers: "There 
are certain people that draw attention."sl 
Not only did the state that sought to execute Neill understand this as 
a homosexual case, but defense tactics also aggressively highlighted the 
gay context of these crimes. Most dramatically, prior to trial, Neill's 
attorney claimed that the marital privilege prevented the introduction into 
evidence of comments Neill and Johnson had made to each other.s2 
Although the strategy of attempting to control the harm to Neill from 
incriminating evidence from Johnson was quite sensible, promoting gay 
marriage at this time and place and in the context of this murder trial 
proved to be highly inflammatory. According to the press, part of the 
basis for the motion was the codefendants' joint checking account in the 
First Bank of Chattanooga in Geronimo, the very bank where the victims 
were murdered.s3 The defense motion also argued that Neill and Johnson 
were living "in the nature of a marriage relationship," including sharing a 
bedroom in their apartment and sharing a hotel room in San Francisco 
during their flight after the crime.S4 
Editorializing against the marital privilege motion, the Lawton, 
Oklahoma newspaper, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, pointedly reminded its 
readers that homosexual sodomy was a serious felony under Oklahoma 
law: "It seems odd ... that at least part of the defense strategy would be 
based on something illegal under Oklahoma law: homosexual conduct. 
A person guilty of a crime against nature, which includes homosexual 
acts, is subject to a prison term of up to 10 years."S5 The editorial 
concluded, "The Geronimo defendants are trying to give new meaning to 
80. Chris Kinyon, Remark May Have Led to Deaths in Geronimo, DAlLY OKLAHOMAN, 
Dec. 18, 1984, at 1 ("Financial problems and what an alleged killer took to be a derisive remark 
about being gay may have smoldered and burst into the violence that led to the deaths of four 
people and the injuring of three others in the bank at Geronimo last Friday, officials said Monday. 
Jay Wesley Neill, 19, ... had an account at the bank ... and was allegedly at one time teased by 
one of the victims about being gay."). 
81. Chris Kinyon, Slaying Suspects Plagued by Debts, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 5, 1985, 
at 1,2. 
82. Chris Kinyon, 'Marital Pn'vilege' Denied Geronimo Slayings Suspects," DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, May 3,1985, at 20. 
83. Jd 
84. Jd The prosecutor's later misstatement about Neill as a "vowed homosexual" is 
particularly ironic in light of the earlier marital privilege motion that had established resoundingly 
that Neill and Johnson were not "vowed" homosexuals. 
85. Strange Defense Strategy, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 2, 1985, at 18. 
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the phrase, 'marriage of convenience,' but it looks like a queer strategy to 
US."S6 The editorial's language was actually more restrained than that of 
the Oklahoma legislature, which punished then and purports to punish 
today "the detestable and abominable crime against nature."87 Indeed, the 
only group more appalled by Neill and Johnson's claim of marital 
privilege than the local citizenry might have been any gay rights 
advocacy groups attempting to design a winning litigation strategy for 
same-sex marriage. 88 A newspaper account of the marriage claim quoted 
the lieutenant in the sheriff's office who was supervisor of the jail as 
saying that "[t]he two have never mentioned being married" but that he 
had "heard conversations between the two that 'they're going to get 
married when they get OUt.",89 He added that if they had wedding rings, 
they were not allowed to wear them in jai1.90 
Not only was the publicity surrounding the case filled with explicit 
references to Neill and Johnson's homosexuality, but the formal court 
proceedings were replete with explicit and more subtle cues, signals, and 
taunts. For example, in testimony dripping with contempt, the state 
86. Id 
87. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 2007). The statute in full provides, "Every 
person who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with 
mankind or with a beast, is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding ten (10) 
years." Id Oddly, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), apparently has not led to any 
legislative reworking or repeal of the statute. Section 886 appears to apply to consensual acts. 
Compare this section to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 888 (West 2007), which addresses forcible 
sodomy. In 1986, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled the "crime against nature" statute 
unconstitutional as applied to heterosexual sodomy, but, following the lead of Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reserved the question of the continuing applicability of the 
statute against homosexual activity. See Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1986) ("It now appears to us that the right to privacy, as formulated by the Supreme Court, 
includes the right to select consensual adult sex partners. . .. We stress that our decision today in 
no way affects the validity of 21 O.S. 1981, § 886 in its application to bestiality, forced sexual 
activity, sexual activity of the underaged, or public or commercial sexual acts. We do not reach the 
question of homosexuality since the application of the statute to such conduct is not an issue in 
this case."). 
88. To provide historical context, the National ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project 
was not started until June 1986, and the ACLU became perhaps the first non-gay organization to 
endorse same-sex marriage in October 1986, six months after Neill's same-sex marriage privilege 
claim was filed. Nan Hunter, Memories of the Beginning of the Project, in ANNuAL UPDATE OF 
THE ACLU's NATIONWIDE WORK ON LGBT RIGHTS AND HlVlAIDS 12 (2006), aVaJlable at 
http://www.aclu.orglimages/assecupload_file401_26559.pdf. Within gay and lesbian communi-
ties, a prominent debate that marked the beginning of high visibility for efforts to achieve same-
sex marriage was not published until 1989. See Paula Ettelbrick, Since Men Is Mamage a Path 
to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Autumn 1989, at 8; see also Thomas Stoddard, My Gay People 
Should Seek the Right to Many, OUT/LOOK, Autumn 1989, at 8. 
89. Chris Kinyon, Geronimo Suspects Claim 'Mamage,' DAlLY OKLAHOMAN, May 1, 
1985, at 1-2. 
90. Id 
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psychiatrist who testified that Neill was competent to stand trial 
described him as "a little guy who wants to pout and put on a show.,,91 
At trial, the jurors were reminded of the salience of Neill's gay 
identity from their first appearances at jury selection. Neill's attorney 
attempted to root out antigay bias in his initial questioning of potential 
jurors. He began, ''Now, my client, as everybody in the community 
knows, is a homosexual. That is the label that is constantly applied with 
him. You've heard that before, haven't yoU?,,92 They had. And if they 
had not heard it before, they heard it countless times during jury 
selection.93 
The voir dire provides a sample of religious thought regarding 
homosexuality in Lawton, Oklahoma, at the time, and a tricky tightrope 
walk for defense counsel attempting to ferret out bias without solidifying 
it for the group. Most potential jurors claimed affiliation with a Christian 
church; some did not know the views of their churches on 
homosexuality, but several stated that their churches were opposed.94 
91. Chris Kinyon, Psychiatrist Says Killers Competent, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 2, 
1987, at 10. In attempting to establish that Johnson was not competent to stand trial, his defense 
presented direct evidence relating to his homosexuality, specifically that psychological tests done 
prior to the crimes showed that Johnson was "extremely disturbed ... with substantial 
psychological, sexual, social and identity problems." 1. Green, Neill, Johnson Tests Jnsufficient, 
Doctor Hans VonBrauchitsch Testifies, THE LAWTON CONSTITUTION, Sept. I, 1987, at IA. The 
defense psychiatrist testified that the test results suggested that Neill was paranoid, and that he 
should have been tested for brain damage caused by encephalitis he suffered as a child. Jd 
92. Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 149, State v. Neill, No. CRF-84-S97 (District Court 
of Comanche County, Okla. Sept. 22, 1992) (unpublished transcript, on file with author) 
[hereinafter Trial Transcript]. 
93. See generally id at 7S-2S0. 
94. See generally id When asked his church's teaching on homosexuality, potential juror 
"Smith" explained, "It's really not publicized. Some people are for it; some people don't have any 
viewpoint; some people are totally against it. It depends." Jd at ISO. All jurors have been given 
pseudonyms to protect their privacy. Transcripts with actual juror names are on file with Law &-
Sexuality. The next potential juror, "Jones," explained that her church was against 
homosexuality: "we-in the bible it's against, you know, all of our views on that." Jd That same 
potential juror, who was church clerk of the Mission Village Baptist Church, averred that her 
religious attitudes against homosexuality would not affect how she would react to the evidence. 
Jd at lSI. The next potential juror, a Baptist, agreed that his church, too, taught that 
homosexuality is contrary to the Bible but that it would not cause him to be biased. Jd at IS3-S4. 
The defense counsel asked the entire panel whether any of them were "affiliated with a group on 
either side of the homosexuality issue." Jd at IS4. Ms. "Richards" indicated that she was, as the 
wife of a minister of the New Zion Baptist Church, but that she could "definitely" give Neill a 
fair trial. Jd Potential juror "Winchester," a member of the Holy Family Catholic Church, 
explained that his church's views on homosexuality were the same as the Baptists'. Jd at ISS. 
But Mr. "Winchester" explained that his twenty-one years in the military meant that he "had to 
deal with several situations of that nature" and that "it never bothered [him] before." Jd The next 
potential juror was Catholic, and described the same views, and that it would not bother him. Jd 
at IS6. The next potential juror attended the Stecker Assembly of God, where he had never heard 
homosexuality mentioned. Jd at IS7. This juror, too, disclaimed any prejudice against gays. Jd 
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One potential juror acknowledged that he was not affiliated with any 
church.95 He answered that his "viewpoint on homosexuality" was that 
"[t]hey're people. That's it.,,96 In light of the pervasive Christian 
affiliations expressed by so many jurors, the prosecutor's explanation that 
he used a peremptory challenge against an African American woman in 
part because of her "close religious affiliation,,97 is difficult to credit, 
although the trial court did so in denying the defense's Batson98 motion 
based on the prosecutor having used peremptory challenges against the 
first three possible African American jurors.99 
Having probed the religiously-based attitudes toward homosexu-
ality, Neill's attorney presented the group with a more open-ended 
inquiry: "Is there anybody here who's-who themselves or their spouse 
have ever had homosexuals that have somehow affected their life or 
intruded into their life and brought their lifestyle into collision with your 
Potential juror "Dean" attended the First Assembly of God in Lawton, and the next potential juror, 
"Samson," attended the Cache Christian Church, which she did not think discussed 
homosexuality. Id at 15S-59. Potential juror "Samson" summarized her position on 
homosexuality stating, "It's their business as long as it doesn't affect me and their jobs or 
whatever." Id at 159. The next juror, Mrs. "Page," attended Lawton Christian Center, where 
"[the minister has] never preached a sermon on it, but I can say that he probably doesn't agree 
with it." Id at 161. Mrs. "Page" agreed, though, that what someone else does does not bother 
her. Id Potential juror "Washington" went to the Bethlehem Baptist Church, Jd at IS7, but she 
did not know the Church's position on homosexuality. Id She would not be bothered by the city 
hiring a "homosexual fire fighter" or "homosexual teacher." Id at 162. The next potential juror 
was a member of the Fletcher Baptist Church, which she characterized as teaching that 
homosexuality is "wrong." Id at 190. She claimed that she would not discriminate against a 
homosexual in hiring. Id 
95. Id at 162. 
96. Id 
97. Id at lSI. 
9S. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, S9 (19S6) (holding that the Equal Protection 
clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely because of their race). 
99. See Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at IS0-S1. Ms. "Richards," a black woman, was 
the first juror excused by the prosecutor. Id at lSI. In response to a Batson challenge, the 
prosecutor claimed that her "close religious affiliation" made him leery, and that "[s]he had a 
very small-about a three inch hat-sitting on the middle of the top of her head much like an 
organ grinder would. . .. [D]uring the time Mr. Pearson's voir dire she was shaking her head 
adamantly up and down on issues of fair trial and would hear all the evidence and would not 
convict unless the evidence was beyond a reasonable doubt." Id The prosecutor challenged all 
three of the first three blacks that were potential jurors. Id at 277. The prosecutor's explanation 
of his challenge to Mrs. "Green" included that "[s]he is very independent and haughty in her 
actions. That's how the State perceives her and that's why I'm asking to take her off." Id In the 
discussion about the overruled Batson motion, defense counsel stated, "I don't consider Hispanics 
to be minorities. They are fine people." Id at 27S. The prosecutor subsequently challenged the 
only other black potential juror, Mr. "Daly," because he retired from the military at a relatively 
low rank (sergeant first class) and because he was born and raised in the Chicago area. "Whether 
it be right or wrong I have a feeling about the crime rate in an urban area and this individual's 
exposure to it. Has grown up with the idea of seeing and hearing in the news every day about 
killings and deaths." Id at 463-64. 
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own lives?"loo Neill's attorney's question assumed that none of the 
potential jurors was gay, and his use of "intruded" and "collision" 
betrayed either his own discomfort and distancing from homosexuality or 
his strategic reflection of attitudes likely to be held by potential jurors. 
We can imagine that defense counsel's discomfort was negligible, 
however, in comparison to that of the potential jurors he was questioning. 
The question required one potential juror, Ms. "Anderson," to out her 
brother-in-law. 101 She told the court that her husband's brother is a 
homosexual, and that "[w]e just both tell him that we can't judge him. 
Only God can judge; we can't judge him on what he does. If that's what 
he wants to do that's-it's up to him.,,102 Loyally, in answer to the defense 
counsel's question whether the gay brother had been banished from the 
family, Ms. "Anderson" said, "No. No. We love him very dearly. He's a 
very good man.,,103 
Defense counsel's question to potential juror "Simmons" was 
terribly clumsy: "Have you ever had a homosexual involvement-I 
mean people coming into your life and causing. you or your family 
trouble or interruptions or offended you in any way because of some 
homosexual relationship?"I04 She answered, ''Not just because of 
homosexual, no."lOS In a variety of ways, again and again, jurors with 
religious attitudes against homosexuality and those without, all declared 
that their attitudes about homosexuality would not prevent them from 
rendering a fair tria1. 106 In other words, just in the process of jury 
selection, jurors were repeatedly reminded that Neill was homosexual, 
that most of the religions in town were against homosexuality, that being 
100. Id at 160. 
101. Id 
102. Id 
103. Id 
104. Id at 199. 
105. Id 
106. See id at 75-250. Potential juror "Green" declared that "[Neill's homosexuality] isn't 
a factor to me because he is a human being his sexual preferences are his own and that does not 
bother me in the least." Id at 210. Potential juror "Brown" said that she did not at all have a 
problem with hiring a homosexual to be a school teacher or a mail carrier or a police officer. Id 
at 223. Potential juror "Dolan" said that in his military career he never knowingly came into 
contact with people who were homosexual and that he "would have had to report it should I have 
known." Id at 258. He disclaimed any problem if his employer hired a person who was 
homosexual. Id The next potential juror had heard quite a bit on television that Neill had a 
homosexual past, but she was not bothered by homosexuality and homosexuals had never 
intruded into her life or her marriage. Id at 268. The prosecutor later asked a potential juror: 
"The fact that Mr. Neill is a homosexual does that cause you any problem with setting [sic] on 
this case?" That juror answered in the negative. Id at 429. Apparently the defense counsel only 
asked the first panel of potential jurors the homosexuality questions. See id at 75-250. 
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opposed to homosexuality was nonnal, and that being against 
homosexuality did not mean being unfair.lo7 
Once the jury was impaneled, the first thing the prosecutor told the 
jury about the facts of the case in his opening statement was that "Robert 
Grady Johnson and Jay Neill were homosexual lovers." 108 The 
prosecutor's statement proceeded with countless references to Neill and 
Johnson's homosexual relationship, and with multiple more subtle 
references to stereotypes about gay men, namely that they are woman-
hating, materialistic, flamboyant, flighty, superficial, and selfish. 109 For 
example, the prosecutor emphasized three occasions on which Neill had 
referred to a bank employee or other woman as a "bitch."IIO He also 
presented Neill as irresponsibly flighty: "One day [in December, Neill] 
did not come to work claiming that he was so disgusted with the bank he 
did not think he could work or perfonn.,,111 The prosecutor emphasized 
that Neill pretended to have money,112 and that shortly after the robbery 
Neill and Johnson "appeared happy. Dressed alike. Very nice."113 
Inevitably, the prosecutor emphasized the co-defendants' flight to San 
Francisco, their partying in the Castro district, and that they brought a 
man back to their hotel suite. 114 
The prosecutor also used his opening statement to tell the jurors that 
when Neill was arrested by FBI agents in San Francisco, Neill "asked 
them whether or not his mother would have to find OUt.,,115 That the 
prosecutor focused the jury's attention on this is surprising, because 
usually the defense-not the prosecution-attempts to humanize the 
defendant by highlighting his youth and immaturity.116 But Neill's sad 
and pathetic question about his mother fit the prosecution's implicit 
107. Of course, even critical commentary about stereotypes repeats them and therefore 
reinforces them. See also Todd Brower, Multistable Figures: Sexual Orientation Visibility and Its 
Effects on the Expenences ofSexua/ Minorities in the CoUI1s, 27 PACE L. REv. 141, 165 (2007) 
(reviewing studies of judicial experiences of sexual minorities and finding that "visibility and 
knowledge of minority sexuality cannot be ignored once learned"). 
108. Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 566. 
109. Id at 568-655. 
liD. Id at 570, 656, 658. Neill and Johnson made the bank teller (later killed) "uneasy 
and uncomfortable." Id at 580. 
Ill. Id at 590. 
112. Id at 583 (stating that Neill told the travel agent he did not dress like he had a lot of 
money but money was no problem). 
113. Id at 586. 
114. See id at 625. 
115. Id at 642. 
116. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 25. 
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theme of gay neurosis, perhaps specifically the trope of gay men being 
unnaturally close to their mothers. I 17 
Whether disturbing or banal, Neill's homosexuality was a persistent 
theme throughout the rest of the trial. For example, a neighbor testified 
that she was aware that "Neill and Johnson's sexual preference" was 
"homosexual.,,"8 She also testified during the trial of Robert Grady 
Johnson that "Johnson and Neill both like expensive clothes and jewelry" 
and that "Johnson would manipulate Neill by asking for things and 
getting upset when he didn't get them.,,"9 A friend and roommate of the 
couple was also asked whether she was aware of their sexual preference; 
yes, she answered, she knew that they were homosexuals.'20 
In response to the state's questioning, the neighbor testified that she 
never discussed religion with Neill and Johnson, and did not know if they 
were practicing any religion. '21 The roommate testified that to her 
knowledge, Neill and Johnson were not practicing Christians. 122 The 
prosecution's strategy of emphasizing not only that Neill and Johnson 
were homosexuals, but that they were God-less homosexuals, made 
excellent sense in light of the deep and wide Christian affiliations of the 
jurors. The relevance of Neill and Johnson's lack of religious activity to 
Neill's guilt for the crimes is much less clear. 
Not surprisingly, the damning specifics of the escape to San 
Francisco were emphasized in the prosecutor's opening statement, 
through testimony, again in closing argument,123 and, indeed, in the Tenth 
Circuit recitation of the strength of the case against Neill. '24 At trial, a 
hotel clerk from the Holiday Inn Union Square testified that Neill and 
Johnson told her that "they were out here for a good time and they were 
kind of like on a shopping spree.,,125 She remembered specifically that 
117. This theme had made its way into legal scholarship of a decidedly antigay 
perspective. See, e.g., A. Dean Byrd & Stony Olsen, Homosexuality: Innate and Immutable?, 14 
REGENT U. L. REv. 383, 402 (2002) (citing as authority a 1992 book on so-called "reparative 
therapy," that is, therapy to eliminate homosexual desire). 
118. Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 677. 
119. Tom Jackson, Johnson No Murderer, Deknse Lauyer Says, THE LAWlDN 
CONSTITUTION, July 16, 1993, at AI. 
120. Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 684. She also testified that "they fought a lot and it 
was very tense." ld She testified that she knew that Neill was discharged from the Army before 
his enlistment was up. ld at 685. 
121. ldat679. 
122. ld at 690. 
123. See, e.g., id at 625,884, 1038. 
124. See Neill I, 263 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2001); see also NeIlllI, 278 F.3d 1044, 
1060-61 (10th Cir. 2001). 
125. Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 854. 
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Neill had admired her angora sweater.126 Although years later the Lawton 
jurors might have been entertained by Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, at 
the time of the testimony, men on "shopping sprees" who were 
knowledgeable about angora were probably understood as gay in more 
clearly pejorative ways. 
The San Francisco limousine driver was permitted to testify that he 
took Neill and Johnson to "expensive" stores in Union Square,127 and 
drove them to a gay bar in the Castro Area, which the limo driver 
identified to the jury as "the gay area of San Francisco.,,128 The limo 
driver testified that they picked up a man at one of the bars, who stayed 
with them, while they went to another bar and then to their hotel. 129 The 
jurors learned that Neill and Johnson told the limo driver that "they liked 
San Francisco very much" and that they "thought they might like to live 
out there."l3o 
The prosecution's case emphasized the couple's San Francisco drug 
use131 and exorbitant, self-indulgent spending on jewelryl32 and matching 
leather jackets. 133 Nothing could justify murdering four people while 
robbing a bank, but the trip to San Francisco and the shopping spree 
made the crimes even more horrible. Perhaps none of the San Francisco 
evidence was relevant to Neill's guilt or innocence of the bank murders, 
or perhaps its minor relevance was overcome by its severe prejudicial 
impact. The prejudice to Neill was not merely the decadence of the story, 
but the likely abhorrence of the jurors-and the rest of the participants in 
the trial-to the specifically gay depravity of the story. But the defense 
motion to exclude the San Francisco evidence was denied. 134 The 
prosecution's narrative of the depraved pilgrimage to a Mecca of gay 
culture was too powerful to be denied. 
Neill did not contest his guilt, and the jury found him guilty on all 
counts. 135 Neill did, however, attempt to defend against the death penalty 
in the sentencing phase of his trial. 136 Neill's homosexuality was a major 
126. Id "They were happy. In good spirits. Having a good time." Id at 858. 
127. Id at 873. 
128. Id at 876. 
129. Id at 879. 
130. Id at 882. Neill and Johnson were "enjoying themselves" and "[v]ery happy." Id at 
884. 
131. See id at 885. 
132. See id at 934-35. 
133. Seeidat914. 
134. Id at 859. 
135. Id at 1065. 
136. Id at 1137. 
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theme in his penalty phase testimony about his life. 137 Neill also told 
about his severe health problems as a child, including several years in a 
chest hospital and having his head split open and going into a coma from 
his father throwing him against a wall for not stopping crying, which 
were typical of the kinds of life stories recounted by many capital 
defendants. 138 But Neill's testimony about his crimes situated them 
squarely as a symptom of his relationship with Johnson. 
Neill testified that he met Johnson about ten months before the 
crimes at a club called Scandals that was "a homosexual establish-
ment.,,139 He described the unraveling of their life together, as their drug 
use became out of control and they ran out of money. 140 In testimony that 
simultaneously privileged gay sex as evidence of relative normality and 
contradictorily equated it with other dissolute behavior, Neill told the 
jury that before the robbery, "[ s lex had virtually ceased for two or three 
weeks and the parties and drugs had taken its place.,,141 
Neill's testimony presented his relationship with Johnson as 
desperate and obsessive, and the bank robbery as a way to keep Johnson 
from leaving: "I wanted to prove to Robby what I'd do to keep his 
love.,,142 Neill testified, 
I think that he was trying to let me make a fool out of myself. I think he 
wanted out of the relationship very badly and he didn't know how to go 
about that and if I went ahead ... I would probably in his eyes get arrested 
and the problem would be cured for him. He would have everything that 
was important to him which were our things .... 143 
Neill attempted to explain that that he needed money quickly to save his 
relationship with Johnson.144 He testified that, "now that I look back and 
at that time I didn't realize it, but now-if there was no money there was 
no relationship on his side.,,145 
137. See id at IOS9-1137. 
13S. See id at 1103-04. Like most capital defendants, see Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital 
Punishment Is Not Morally Required· Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 5S STAN. 
L. REv. 751, 766 (2005) ("Though capital defendants have usually committed (or participated in) 
heinous murders, they very frequently ... are survivors of childhood abuse .... "), Neill's early 
family life was not stable; his parents divorced when he was two, and he was sent to live with his 
grandparents. Id at 103. Neill explained that his mother had stopped coming to visit him 
because "[s]he's had two nervous breakdowns over this and she could not stand to see me in a 
position like that because she did not feel like this was her little boy." Id at 1105. 
139. Id at 1I07-0S. 
140. Id at IIOS-14, IISI. 
141. Id at I lSI. 
142. Id at 1224. 
143. Id at 1116. 
144. Id at 1190. 
145. Id at 1114. 
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The plan was to spend the money and commit suicide: "1 didn't 
want to be separated from Robby and 1 didn't feel like 1 could live with 
[the murders].,,146 Neill explained to the jurors that he had never shared a 
cell with Johnson on death row,147 apparently refuting speculation about 
their lives in prison. Neill told the jurors that he no longer had contact 
with his mother because her psychiatrist had advised her to put Neill 
completely out of her life. 148 Neill testified that he would not appeal a 
sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole: "1 don't think this 
case deserves sympathy in any way, shape or form . .. 1 want this to end 
for my family. 1 want this to end for the families that are involved."149 
The gay relationship was central to the crime and the punishment, 
and prominent in both guilt and penalty phases of the trial. In his closing 
argument at the end of the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecutor 
emphasized that Neill was "[v]ery selfish.,,150 The prosecutor argued that 
the reason for the killings was "so the killers would have money to fly to 
San Francisco, party at the gay bars, to tour San Francisco and to have a 
good time.,,151 The prosecutor reminded the jury of evidence that Neill 
"kisse[d] Johnson as he [left] the apartment lightly and he [said] wish me 
luck.,,152 At the airport, "they're dressed alike. They're happy. They're 
cheerful.,,153 "San Francisco. Stay in a suite, not a regular room, a suite. 
Want a room with a view, price is no object.,,154 "Saturday, went 
shopping. Sixteen hundred dollars in jewelry. Nine hundred and thirty-
one dollars in leather jackets, top of the line all the way. Three items of 
jewelry sixteen hundred dollars. How many of us have ever paid that 
kind of money.,,155 "Saturday night they go partying. They go to the 
Castro area and make the homosexual bars.,,156 "And they pick up a party 
at that bar and they take him to Lord Jim's with 'em .... "157 "Take the 
third party back to the room, more partying."158 "1 submit to you ifthere's 
any remorse in your soul you don't pick up a total stranger third party 
146. Id at 1127. Neill testified that after the murders, he went home "[a]nd walked into 
the bathroom and [he] got into the shower because [he] felt like [he] was gonna be able to wash 
something away that [he] couldn't." Id at 1124. 
147. Idatl138. 
148. Id at 1157. 
149. Id at 1245. 
150. Id at 1295. 
151. Id at 1296. 
152. Id at 1297. 
153. Id 
154. Id at 1298. 
155. Id at 1299. 
156. Id 
157. Id at 1300. 
158. Id 
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and bring him back to your room with a view to spend the night with you 
,,159 
On the defense side, Neill's case for life also depended on 
pathologizing his relationship with Johnson. Under Oklahoma's death 
penalty statutes, the jury determines life or death by balancing the 
aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. l61l 
Following the Oklahoma Supreme Court's directive that "a mitigating 
circumstance for the jury to consider is whether 'the murder was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance,"'161 the jury that sentenced Neill was 
instructed by the court to consider as a possible mitigating circumstance 
that "[t]he defendant was suffering extreme mental and emotional 
disturbances with regard to his relationship with Robert Grady Johnson 
which affected his mental thought processes.,,162 This defense 
instruction-that the extreme mental and emotional disturbance caused 
by Neill's relationship with Johnson was a possible mitigating factor-
was the point that the prosecutor said he was addressing when he told the 
jury to consider that "[t]his man is a vowed homosexual. He had a gay 
lover he didn't want to lose,,,163 and that the "true person, what kind of 
person he is ... is a homosexual."l64 These were the prosecutor's words 
recognized by the Tenth Circuit as error, but found to be harmless. 165 
III. WHY Is CONDEMNING HOMOSEXUALITY WRONG? 
The Tenth Circuit majority and dissent agreed that the prosecutor's 
identification in his closing argument of Neill as homosexual was error. 166 
Commentators concur. 167 But, why, exactly, was it wrong? 
159. Id 
160. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.10,701.11 (West 2007). 
161. Cox v. State, 644 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (quoting Johnson v. State, 
121 P.2d 625 (Okla. Cr. 1942». 
162. Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 1271. 
163. Id at 1283. 
164. Id at 1286. The disputed argument repeated Neill's homosexual identity three times. 
"I'd like to go through some things that to me depict the true person, what kind of person he is. 
He is a homosexual. The person you're sitting in judgment on-disregard Jay Neill. You're 
deciding life or death on a person that's a vowed [sic] homosexual .... But these are areas you 
consider whenever you determine the type of person you're setting [sic] in judgment on .... The 
individual's homosexual. He's in love with Robert Grady Johnson." Id at 1286-87. 
165. SeeNei/lII,278F.3d 1044, 1061 (I0thCir.2001). 
166. Seeidat 1061, 1064. 
167. For arguments that antigay bias is impermissible in capital sentencing, see Aaron M. 
Clemons, Executing Homosexuality: Removing Anti-Gay Bias /fom Capital Tn8/s, 6 GEO. 1. 
GENDER & L. 71, 73 (2005) (arguing that Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas establish that 
anti gay bias is not a permissible factor in a death sentence and arguing for flushing out antigay 
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This would be an easy question, not worth raising, if evidence of 
Neill's homosexuality was not otherwise before the jury. The principle 
that prejudicial irrelevant evidence should not be introduced at trial is 
recognized without controversy. 168 Such evidence distracts from the 
proper evidence, adding prejudicial impact without corresponding 
value. 169 This is true in any criminal context, and even more true in the 
sentencing phase of a capital case, laced with constitutional protections 
that recognize that "death is different" and attempt to produce "reliable" 
death sentences. 170 
Neill's case, however, is much more difficult. Evidence of Neill's 
homosexuality was pervasive throughout the guilt and penalty phases of 
the trial, and was introduced by both the defense and prosecution. 171 
Here, the prosecutor asserted that he was simply attempting to address 
the defense's own evidence that presented Neill's tortured relationship 
with Johnson as mitigation evidence.172 Also, the prosecutor did not use 
any pejorative modifiers; he simply declared, repeatedly, that Neill was a 
bias in voir dire); LaDonna Childress, To Fulfill a Promise: Using Canons 3B(5) and 3B(6) of 
the Judicial Code of Conduct to Combat Sexual Onentation Bias Against Gay and Lesbian 
Cnininal Dekndimts, 34 Sw. U. L. REv. 607,632 (2005) ("Any suggestion that sexual orientation 
provides additional justification for the infliction of the death penalty must certainly fall outside 
the scope of legitimate advocacy and result in reversible error."); Michael B. Shortnacy, 
Comment: Guilty and Gay, A Recipe fOr Execution in Amencan Courtrooms: Sexual 
Orientation as a Tool for Prosecutonal Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 309 
(2001) (discussing Neill! and Neill!I, and other cases in arguing that unrelated evidence of 
homosexual status in penalty phases or prejudicial and inflammatory prosecutorial statements 
about homosexual identity should constitute reversible error); Joey L. Mogul, The Dylaer, The 
Butcher, the Better: The State s Use of Homophobia and Sexism to Execute Women in the United 
States, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 473 (2005) (decrying introduction of evidence of capital defendant's 
lesbianism). For analysis of bias against sexual minorities in the judicial system, see Todd 
Brower, Multistable Figures: Sexual Onentation Visibility and Its Elkcts on the Experiences of 
Sexual Minorities in the CoUI1s, 27 PACE L. REv. 141 (2007). 
168. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 403. 
169. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE, 132-33 (2002) (explaining the many possible policy 
reasons underlying Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403). 
170. "Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison 
term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a 
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment. ... " Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Opn. of 
Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, J1.); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("[T]he penalty of 
death is different in kind from any other punishment."). For an assessment of the gendered nature 
of the insistence that fundamentally discretionary death judgments are either reliable or accurate, 
see Joan W. Howarth, Deciding To Kill: The Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 
1345, 1378-80. 
171. See geneml.(yTrial Transcript, supm note 92. 
172. !d at 1283. 
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homosexual. 173 In this context, why was it wrong for the prosecutor to 
point to Neill's homosexuality in argument? 
If homosexuals were not widely condemned, the prosecutor could 
point out that Neill was homosexual in the same way that he could point 
out that he was a young man, or lived in an apartment, or was a military 
veteran. It would not be improper because it would not be prejudicial. 
On the other hand, unless homosexuality is recognized as a social 
identity worthy of protection, the prosecutor could have safely identified 
Neill as a homosexual with the same impunity with which he identified 
Neill as a murderer, a debtor, and a cocaine user. In other words, 
determining whether the prosecutor's argument for death focusing on 
Neill's homosexuality was error requires a purely normative judgment 
about homosexuality. 
As Neill sat on death row, with his case winding slowly through 
various courts, the fact of his crimes remained a terrible constant, but the 
normative meanings of homosexual identity, at least as constituted in 
United States law, were changing. Neill's crimes occurred six months 
before Bowers v. Hardwick,174 his execution six months before Lawrence 
v. Texas.175 In the shift from Bowers to Lawrence, the Supreme Court 
moved from aversion to homosexuality to aversion to antihomosexual 
laws. 176 Miranda Oshige McGowan has described the message of the 
Lawrence Court that gays and lesbians constitute a social group worthy 
of the law's protection as the transformation from outlaws to ingroup; 
according to McGowan, the court made a normative judgment that gays 
and lesbians are "socially salient groups whose common conduct it 
deems worth protecting.,,177 The Tenth Circuit opinions in Neill I and 
Nel11 II, especially Judge Lucero's dissents, reflect and create a similar 
normative transformation. 178 Judge Lucero's Neill I and Neil II dissents 
recognized Neill as a member of an identity-based social movement, 
whose common conduct-homo sexuality-was worth protecting.179 
Homosexuality was not construed as conduct worth protecting at 
the time and place of Neill's crimes. Neill and Johnson's lives together as 
gay lovers occurred before substantial legal rights for gays and lesbians 
173. See generally id 
174. See 478 US. 186 (l986). 
175. See 539 US. 558 (2003). 
176. Compare Bowers, 478 US. at 186, with Lawrence, 539 US. at 558. 
177. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and 
the Inevitable Nonnativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1312, 1344 (2004). 
178. See generally Nelll II, 278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001). 
179. See generally Neill I, 263 F.3d 1184, 1199-1205 (lOth Cir. 2001) (Lucero, J., 
dissenting); Neill II, 278 F.3d at 1064 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
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had been established. At the time of the crimes, homosexual activity was 
illegal in Oklahoma,180 elected officials "knew" that gays were angry, 
violent men who hated women, and harassment, isolation, and contempt 
were too ordinary parts of gay life. 181 At the time of the defense's pretrial 
motion asserting marital privilege between Neill and Johnson, marriage 
for two gay men was available nowhere in the world, and was not a 
concept of which many Americans were aware. By the time of Neill's 
execution in 2002, same sex marnage was about to arrive in 
Massachusetts. 182 
By the end of Neill's life, homosexuality had become a more 
recognized, stable, normal identity. By the time Neill's case reached the 
Tenth Circuit in 2001, Judge Lucero saw Neill's homosexuality within a 
recently established category of gay person as victim of invidious 
discrimination. Judge Lucero's opinion decries the bigotry in 
condemning homosexuality by explicitly comparing the prosecutor's 
highlighting of Neill's homosexuality to anti-Semitism or racism. 18) This 
comparison is possible only because of prior cultural success in 
repeatedly framing homosexuality as an identity status that deserves to 
be protected from bigotry and denunciation. 
In Judge Lucero's opinion, the strength of the normative judgment 
and the cultural resonance of the comparison of anti gay bias to anti-
Semitism and racism overwhelms any formal doctrinal weaknesses in the 
analogy. Those formal weaknesses are not hard to uncover. The Free 
Exercise Clause explicitly protects religious minorities from purposeful 
state discrimination,184 and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits 
intentional race discrimination in sentencing. 18S The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the state may not "attach[] the 'aggravating' label to 
factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the 
sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political 
affiliation of the defendant.,,186 Although formal constitutional protection 
for gays and lesbians is much more tenuous, Romer v. Evans 87 and 
Lawrence v. Texas 88 support the prediction that the current Supreme 
180. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 2007). 
181. See Brawley, supra note 76. 
182. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
183. Neilll, 263 F.3d 1184, 1202 (lOth Cir. 2001) (Lucero, 1., dissenting). 
184. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
185. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Although McCleskey recognizes that 
intentional race discrimination in capital sentencing would violate Equal Protection, McCleskey 
also made proving it exceedingly difficult. 
186. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). 
187. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
188. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Court would be bothered by explicit, irrelevant exhortations to base a 
death verdict on a defendant's homosexual identity. 
The centrality of Neill's homosexuality makes his a much harder 
case, however. After all, with the constitutionally required individualized 
determination,'89 capital jurors must judge the blameworthiness of the 
criminal, not just the crime. 190 As mitigation, Neill presented evidence 
that his crimes were a result of extreme mental and emotional distress 
caused by his homosexual relationship, and that he had renounced his 
homosexuality as part of his conversion to Christianity. 191 If the 
defendant is allowed to seek life by giving evidence of having had the 
"burden of homosexuality" lifted from him, why isn't the prosecutor 
allowed to seek death by reminding the jury of the defendant's past 
homosexual identity? 
The constitutionally required asymmetry of mitigation and 
aggravation is part of the answer. The state's interest in obtaining an 
execution is not protected by such individual rights as the guarantee of 
fundamental fairness and equal protection in the conduct of the trial or 
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, all of which supports the 
defendant's mitigation case but not necessarily the state's case for death. 
But there is more at work than unequal burdens. 
Even in this context, in which the defendant's homosexuality is 
pervasively presented by prosecution and defense, a prosecutor who 
emphasizes a capital defendant's homosexuality is violating the 
normative claim that gays and lesbians, as a group, deserve the state's 
protection from bigotry. Experimenting with other possible labels for 
Neill helps to clarify the power of the construction of homosexual as 
protected minority class. Would it be error to comment on someone 
having a heterosexual affair out of wedlock?'92 "The defendant is an 
adulterer" would be perfectly acceptable, if the defendant had presented 
evidence of emotional distress from an affair as mitigation. In fact, in 
Neill's case, the fragility of the normative claim can be seen from a 
hypothetical subtle shift in the prosecutor's words. If the prosecutor had 
189. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978). 
190. "State killing sets apart the condemned, choosing them to be dramatically expelled 
from the community, from civilization, from the world of the living." Joan W. Howarth, 
Executing White Masculinities: Leaming !Tom Karla Faye Tucker, 81 ORE. L. REV. 183, 195 
(2002); see Austin Sarat, Capital Punishment as a Legal, Political, and Cultural Fact: An 
Introduction, in THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS AND CULTURE 3, 9-
10 (Austin Sarat ed., 1999). 
191. See genemlljlTrial Transcript, supra note 92, at 1099-1258. 
192. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (identifYing the plaintiff as an 
adulterer and emphasizing public policy in favor of marriage). 
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emphasized that Neill was attempting to present as mItIgation a 
relationship based on sexual conduct that violated Oklahoma's criminal 
laws, emphasizing illegal activity instead of status or identity, the error 
might have disappeared. 
In other words, for the prosecutor's words to be recognized as error, 
the relatively new and fragile construction of homosexuals as a minority 
group subjected to unfair and invidious discrimination had to have taken 
hold. This normative judgment is the only reason that the Tenth Circuit 
judges could be sure, and Judge Lucero very sure, that the prosecutor's 
words were error. The prosecutor did not say "Godless homosexual," or 
"sexually perverted homosexual," or "twisted and sick homosexual"; he 
simply said "homosexual." Judge Lucero likely recognized that he did 
not need to use negative modifiers, because the jurors would supply their 
own. 
There might also have been another, more subtle explanation that 
the court could read the prosecutor's words as wrong. Perhaps, ironically, 
the bluntness of the prosecutor's words violated the vestigial cultural 
norm that homosexuality is too dangerous to be discussed out loud. The 
prosecutor committed the error of something approaching uncouthness in 
emphasizing Neill's homosexual identity too explicitly. There is 
something distasteful about expressly calling attention to what was 
apparent. Is this an analogue to the goal of colorblindness? Or is it some 
vestige of the power of the closet, within which homosexuality can be 
tolerated, as long as it is not "flaunted?" Although the trial was replete 
with evidence of sordid sexual intimacies, the prosecutor erred by calling 
attention to them too bluntly. 
Because it was too blatant, "the man is a homosexual,,193 could be 
read as bigotry. Thankfully, Lawrence and NellI show that at least some 
members of the federal judiciary are finding ways to begin to accept the 
cultural/political/legal message that "gay is good.,,194 
V. DEATH BY HARMLESS ERROR 
The majority of the Tenth Circuit recognized that the prosecution's 
words were error, but not a big enough error to require reversal of Neill's 
death sentence. 195 Like much that has come before,l96 the subject of this 
193. See Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 1289. 
194. Cf. JOHN D'EMELlO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970, at 153 (1983) (describing Frank 
Kameny's slogan referencing "Black is Beautiful" and advocacy in the 1960s to promote less 
defensive gay liberation politics). 
195. See Neill II, 278 F.3d at 1061. 
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section is the fallacy of conventional harmless error analysis in capital 
cases.
197 Even regarding determinations of guilt, which in theory are 
based on a right or wrong answer, the counterfactual exercise by which 
an appellate court attempts to determine what would have happened in 
the absence of the error is inevitably guesswork. 198 The speculation 
required in guessing what a penalty phase jury might have done in the 
absence of improperly admitted evidence, incorrect instructions, or 
prosecutorial misconduct is even less firmly tethered to logic or 
predictability. The penalty decision made by capital jurors is a highly 
discretionary and wide open act of conscience. 199 How can the 
counterfactual hypothetical be real when there was no right answer to the 
question, and each juror was entitled to vote against death for any reason 
at all, however personal, as long as it contributed to a "reasoned moral" 
choice?20o However, these familiar arguments about indeterminacy and 
incoherence are not my primary focus here. Neill's case illustrates these 
196. See, e.g., DAVID R. Dow, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON 
AMERICA'S DEATH Row 208 n.3 (2005) ("It is actually impossible to detennine whether a trial 
error has influenced the jury's verdict, and most constitutional errors should therefore be treated 
as fundamental [requiring reversal]."); Sam Kamin, Hannless Error and the Rights/Remedies 
Split, 88 VA. L. REv. I (2002) (emphasizing extreme malleability of hannless error analysis); 
David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Hannless?, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 483 
(2000) (finding hannless error analysis conceptually and logically incoherent). For commentary 
criticizing hannless error analysis in review of prosecutorial misconduct, see Vilija Bilaisis, 
Hannless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457 (1983) 
(arguing that intentional prosecutorial misconduct should be reversible per se); William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Hannless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (200 I ) (using econometric 
model to identify effective incentives to deter prosecutorial misconduct); and Peter Joy, The 
Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and WrongfUl Convictions: Shaping Remedies 
for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 399, 426 (2006) (finding that appellate review provides 
no meaningful restraint on prosecutorial misconduct). 
197. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. PROC. § 52(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that 
does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded."). 
198. As David Dow and James Rytting have already concluded, "hannless error doctrine, 
in its present unsophisticated, incomplete, even incoherent fonn, is just a transparent device for 
overlooking constitutional violations, no matter how egregious, when the victims of those 
violations are men or women whom appellate judges believe to be guilty." Dow & Rytting, supra 
note 196, at 536. 
199. "At the penalty phase, ... there is usually no correct answer. . .. If the prosecutor's 
argument had a deleterious impact on the jury, it will generally be impossible to detennine 
whether, in the absence of the argument, the jury would have nevertheless imposed a death 
sentence." Welch White, Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct in Capital Cases: Imposing 
Prohibitions on Improper Penalty Trial Argwnents, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1147, 1160 (2002); see 
also id at 1151 (asserting that the prosecutor's penalty trial closing argument is especially likely 
to influence the jury). 
200. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, concurring) (requiring 
capital sentencing that "reflect[s] a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, 
character, and crime") (emphasis in original); see Howarth, DECIDING TO KlLL: REVEALING THE 
GENDER IN THE TASK HANDED TO CAPITAL JURORS, 1994 WIS. L. REv. 1345, 1366-81. 
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arguments just as well as hundreds of other cases do, but perhaps no 
better. 
My focus, instead, is a related critique of the frightfully superficial 
reading on which hannless error review rests, and the simplistic 
understanding of communication on which it depends. The gay-centric 
perspective on Neill's case highlights these points. 
The prosecutor's exploitation of antigay bigotry required reversal of 
the death judgment because, as a nonnative matter, such prosecutorial 
misconduct should not be rewarded with an execution. But the Tenth 
Circuit was correct that the prosecutor's comments probably had very 
little impact on the jury's decision.201 The Tenth Circuit majority found 
that the reminders about homosexuality were hannless when balanced 
against the gruesome evidence of the multiple murders.202 Perhaps. But a 
much stronger explanation for why the comments in question may have 
had minimal impact on the jurors' verdict was that the case was about 
homosexuality from the first day in court. Jurors had been questioned 
about their own attitudes about homosexuality, made to reveal 
homosexual relationships, learned about sordid details of a very sad, 
dangerous, homosexual relationship, and heard countless details about 
homosexual conduct that was violent, effeminate, materialistic, drugged 
out, disturbed, and disturbing. Long before the prosecutor's closing 
argument, Neill's identity as a flamboyant, misogynist, materialistic, 
obsessive, sex-crazed, irresponsible homosexual had been finnly 
established.203 Unless they had been sleeping, the jurors probably did not 
need the prosecutor to remind them that Neill's character as a 
homosexual was a reason to condemn him. 
Harmless error analysis isolates a few words on a cold record, and 
speculates about their meaning to jurors. The very inquiry suggests an 
201. See Neill!1, 278 F.3d at 1061. 
202. Seeld 
203. Neill's is not the only case in which a death sentence was obtained in part on the basis 
of condemnation of homosexuality. Other notable examples include the cases of Calvin Burdine, 
Stanley Lingar, and Wanda Jean Allen, included in Richard Goldstein, Queer on Death Row, THE 
VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 13, 200 I, at 38. Calvin Burdine is more well-known as the defendant in the 
notorious Texas case in which the defense attorney was asleep during trial. See Burdine v. 
Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001). Kerry Max Cook, an exonerated man formerly on Texas' 
death row, was convicted and sentenced to death erroneously in part on the basis of bigotry 
related to homosexuality. See KERRY MAx COOK, CHASING JUSTICE: My SWRY OF FREEING 
MYSELF AFTER Two DECADES ON DEATH Row FOR A CRIME I DIDN'T COMMIT 66, 79-82, 94-97 
(2007). Antihomosexual bigotry also taints capital cases where the victims are gay or lesbian. 
See, e.g., BENJAMIN FLEURy-STEINER, JURORS' SWRIES OF DEATH: How AMERICA'S DEATH 
PENALTY INVESTS IN INEQUALITY 57-58 (2007) (describing capital jury split on gender lines over 
attitudes about homosexual victim). 
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almost willful ignorance to the more complex ways that people 
understand information and construct knowledge. 
The jurors who heard this case understood Neill's guilt and 
blameworthiness inevitably within their "knowledge" of what it meant to 
be homosexual. That knowledge almost certainly included "knowledge" 
that gays were sexually perverse, criminally-inclined, effeminate, overly 
emotional, misogynistic, theatrical, dishonest, and Godless.204 
Harmless error analysis is not the only entrenched capital doctrine 
that requires willful ignorance of the complexities of jurors' formation of 
knowledge. For example, appellate courts continue to assume that jurors 
correctly understand the controlling legal principles, ignoring conclusive 
evidence that jurors in capital trials do not understand the instructions in 
the manner intended by the courts.20S 
In light of the record and what the jurors already knew before the 
trial started, how could the prosecutor's final explicit reference to 
homosexuality have made the difference? From beginning to end, this 
was a case about homosexuality. The harmless error analysis of the 
Tenth Circuit reveals the empty formalism of isolating certain words and 
assessing their impact with a simplistic methodology of literalism.206 
Neill's homosexuality was on trial with him. The jurors did not need the 
prosecutor to remind them that Neill was gay, and they did not need the 
prosecutor to remind them that homosexuality was widely understood to 
be something to condemn; these "truths" were pervasively constructed 
204. For studies from the era of the murders showing bias against homosexuals, see 
Sharon B. Gurwitz & Melinda Marcus, Elkcts of Anticipated interaction, Sex, and Homosexual 
Stereotypes on First Impressions, 8 J. APP. Soc. PSYCH. 47, 51, 54 (1978) (describing a survey in 
which subjects perceived to be gay were rated by college students as less calm, dependable, 
honest, and religious and more clothes conscious, emotional, and theatrical than otherwise 
identical but non-gay subject); Alan Taylor, Conceptions of Masculinity and Femininity as a Basis 
for Stereotypes of Male and Female Homosexuals, 9 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 37 (1983) (recounting 
earlier studies and finding prevalent stereotype that homosexuals behave like the opposite sex); 
and Stewart Page & Mary Yee, Conception of Male and Female Homosexual Stereotypes Among 
University Undergraduates, 12 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 109 (1985). 
205. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn lohnson, & Paul Marcus, Correcting Deadly 
ConfUsion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REv: 627 (2000); 
Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, ClanJYing Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional 
Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV: 575 (1997); Craig 
Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of 
CalifOmia's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV: 411 (1994); Theodore Eisenberg 
& Martin T. Wells, Deadly ConfUsion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REv: I 
(1993). 
206. Cf. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REv. 
1545, 1546 (1990) (noting the "growing and equally awkward tension between the ways that 
lawyers typically conduct their business and the insights, now fully acceptable in related 
disciplines but still resisted in law, of Saussurian linguistics, of structuralism, post-structuralism, 
and semiotics, and of various forms of pragmatism and contemporary philosophy"). 
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throughout the case.207 A more meaningful analysis of the unfairness of 
Neill's sentence would have recognized the unfairness of the damning 
visions of homosexuality used throughout his case, including the 
evidence of the San Francisco trip, the bigoted statements by 
investigators, and the rest of the case against homosexuality that was 
presented at trial. 
What is to be done to protect a capital defendant whose life, before 
and after the capital crime, is likely to be misunderstood or reviled by the 
jurors assigned the task of judging that life? The well-established 
patterns of race, class, and gender in death row populations suggest that 
this is a systemic question beyond Jay Neill and other homosexuals.20s 
The contingent and unstable meanings of homosexual identity-. 
simultaneously drawing contempt and protection, in wildly different 
proportions-help to reveal fundamental questions about the Eighth 
Amendment imperative that capital jurors decide life or death in part on a 
judgment about the defendant. In too many cases, the tension between 
fundamental aspirations against invidious discrimination and for 
protection of human dignity through an individualized consideration for 
death might be simply unsustainable. 
CONCLUSION: "WE ARE EVERYWHERE,,209 
The gay rights slogan "We Are Everywhere" caught fire as a 
counter to the invisibility and isolation of homosexuals. The valorizing 
tendency of the gay rights movement has led to extravagant claims of 
homosexual identity for historic giants and greats of literature and the 
207. Judith Butler has made a similar point about the way that the jurors who acquitted the 
police understood the videotape of Rodney King being beaten as in fact a picture of Rodney King 
threatening the police: "For if the jurors came to see in Rodney King's body a danger to the law, 
then this 'seeing' requires to be read as that which was culled, cultivated, regulated-indeed, 
policed-in the course of the trial. . .. This is a seeing which is a reading, that is, a contestable 
construal, but one which nevertheless passes itself off as 'seeing,' a reading which became for that 
white community, and for countless others, the same as seeing." Judith Butler, Endangered! 
Endangenng: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, In READING RODNEY KlNGIREADING 
URBAN UPRISING 16 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993). 
208. See Statistics, Death Penalty Focus, http://deathpenalty.orgiindex.php?pid=I%22 (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2008); National Death Penalty Fact Sheet: Death Penalty 101, American Civil 
Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.orglimages/asset_upload_file758_29292.pdf (last visited Apr. I, 
2008). 
209. "We Are Everywhere" was a slogan of the United States gay liberation movement of 
the 1970s and 1980s. For an appropriation of the slogan, see WE ARE EVERYWHERE: A 
HISIDRICAL SOURCEBOOK OF GAY & LESBIAN POLITICS (Mark Blasius & Shane Phelan eds., 
1997). 
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arts.210 Isolated, tonnented gays and lesbians can find comfort in such 
company, which is not merely legitimate, but exalted. Recognizing Jay 
Neill as a member of the same community is far less comfortable. Neill 
embodies sickness, criminality, and even evil, for those who believe in 
the concept, and more modest faults, including sexual obsession, 
materialism, selfishness, and drug addiction. Jay Neill is a provocative 
counter-example for a political and cultural movement working 
feverishly and with great success to throw off its identification with 
sickness, evil, and criminality. Beyond all of that, Neill himself 
renounced his homosexuality, as did Johnson.211 The axis of pride and 
shame is a meaningful one for gay people,212 and voluntary association 
with Jay Neill weighs heavily on the shame side of that tension, perhaps 
as much as Neill's homosexuality weighed on him. 
Whatever gay identity means, it includes Neill's life and death. In 
death, Neill was a victim of antigay bias. And his life, including his 
terrible crimes, was a gay life. The meanings of gay identity are fluid, 
contingent, and illusive. Gay identity is constructed within competing 
narratives of transgression and nonnality: its boundaries are policed by 
the power of shame and pride, and its meanings are constituted with 
symbols of outcasts and paragons, outlaws and winners. Neill's horrible 
crimes wipe the romance out of a vision of the gay outlaw, and put a gay 
face on unspeakable evil. His is a gay story worth telling. 
A presentation of Neill's life that privileged his gay identity as part 
of the case in mitigation, the case for life, was never possible in the 
210. See, e.g., Gay & Lesbian People in History, http://www.gayheroes.com/main.htm (last 
visited Apr. 1,2008) (including Leonardo da Vinci, Michaelangelo, Tchaikovsky, and Abraham 
Lincoln); Famous Gay People Including Gay Celebrities, Gay Politicians, Historians and Artists, 
http://www.famousandgay.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) (including a list of over 700 people, 
past and present, who have been deemed homosexual or bisexual). 
211. Killer Tells of Slaying at Geronimo, supra note 32, at I, 2. Both Neill and Johnson, 
like other gay capital defendants, renounced their homosexuality while facing death sentences. 
Id And, in this case, Neill was able to present to the jury that through his religious conversion 
"the burden of homosexuality was lifted from him." Id at 2. Thus, we might understand capital 
punishment as a particularly brutal and expensive conversion technique. See generally KENJI 
YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 31-49 (2006) (discussing gay 
conversion, especially psychological conversion attempts, and conversion as first stage of 
movement for full gay equality, before passing and covering). In an interview aired on Pat 
Robertson's The 700 Club, Neill discussed his conversion to Christianity. See Killer Tells of 
Slaying at Geronimo, supra note 32. Neill's lover and co-defendant Robert Grady Johnson also 
renounced his homosexuality as part of his Christianity: Johnson's mother told a reporter, "[he] 
said a light appeared in his cell and he heard the Lord tell him he didn't have to be a homosexual 
and that he was loved and needed." Mark A. Hutchison, Johnson Claims Visit trom God, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, July 28, 1993, at 1-2. 
212. See, e.g., Judith Ha1berstam, Shame and Mite Gay Masculinity, 23 SOCIAL TEXT 
219 (2005). 
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courts in which he was tried. The jurors learned that Neill's parents 
divorced when he was an infant, and that he was raised by his maternal 
grandparents in rural Greenfield, Missouri.213 But the defense did not ask 
the jurors to understand Neill better by telling them about the ridicule 
and scorn he suffered as a child because of his flamboyant gender 
transgressions.214 The local newspaper reported that "friends and school 
officials remember other students in the farming community harassing 
Neill for his flamboyant displays, which included donning a shawl, 
stocking and pumps and going to school in drag. Each time, he was sent 
home."zI5 
Like countless other teenagers who were abused at home and 
punished everywhere for gender transgressions, Neill joined the 
military.zl6 He was discharged from the Army shortly after he met 
Johnson.217 A newspaper described Neill "as a genial young man who 
returned from a stint in the Army a self-styled 'fighting machine.",zI8 
Neill and Johnson "'were the ideal couple that everybody wanted to be 
like,' said a gay high school friend of Johnson's who asked not to be 
identified.' For him, Neill was his dream-the all-American white 
boy.,,219 
In contrast to these perceptions, the reality of Neill's life with 
Johnson was grim and desperate. Neill was supposed to be the bread-
winner, but he had trouble earning a living after being discharged.220 
Neill and Johnson became heavy cocaine users.22I Their financial 
problems and isolation became even more serious.222 Neill imagined that 
robbing their bank would solve their problems and prove his love for 
Johnson.223 Instead, during the bank robbery, Neill exploded with terrible 
213. "Neill, the adopted son of a longtime Missouri lawman, lived as a child with his 
maternal grandparents in Greenfield, Mo., after his mother and natural father divorced." Richard 
W Break, Grandmother Prays for Dekndimt, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 24,1985, at 1-2. Johnson 
also had a troubled childhood. Johnson's mother said about her son, '''He always had a problem 
with kids picking on him and never fought back. It got so that his father (a step-father) began 
calling him a sissy.'" Manny Gamallo, Mom Claims Son Receiving Death Threats, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 4, 1985, at 4. 
214. See genemlijTrial Transcript, supm note 92. 
215. Paul English, Bank Killings Tngger Outrage in Small Town, UNITED PRESS INT'L 
(Lawton, Okla.), Dec. 24,1984. 
216. Trial Transcript, supm note 92, at 1106. 
217. Id at 1107. 
218. English, supmnote 215. 
219. Id ("Their arrests shocked friends who recalled their relationship as the envy of the 
gay community, while triggering outrage among parents and relatives of the victims."). 
220. Trial Transcript, supmnote 92, at 1100-09. 
221. Id at 1287. 
222. Id at 1113. 
223. Id at 1113-14. 
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violence, brutally stabbing to death three women who worked there and 
almost decapitating one of them with the force of his blows.224 He then 
shot four customers who entered the bank during the robbery, killing one 
and wounding three.225 He went home, showered, and took off with 
Johnson on a gay fantasy trip to San Francisco, where they partied in the 
Castro District and splurged on jewelry and leather coats for three days, 
until the FBI arrived to arrest them.226 
Neill's crimes are beyond comprehension, but perhaps at least one 
element was that he was in the grip of a desperate and deeply wrong, 
hyper-masculine gay fantasy. Recognizing and acknowledging that 
Neill's is a gay story could help to loosen the hold of a valorized fantasy 
of gay life and identity, a fictional construction that has its own powerful 
grip, and unleashes its own set of dangers.227 
224. Jd at 1275. 
225. Nell1l, 263 F.3d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 2001). 
226. Trial Transcript, supra note 92, at 1124, 1298. 
227. Cf. Angela Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of 
Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. 1. 1539, 1575 (2006) (warning of a gay movement that 
"mimics rather than avoids the colonizing dynamic"); id at 1569 (citing Marc Spindelman's 
critique of the "like-straight" argument for GLBT acceptance "valorizing those people who look 
just like straight people except for being gay and casting out (again) as weird, sick, and not 
representative of 'us' those whose queerness appears excessive"); MICHAEL WARNER, THE 
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999). 
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